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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
\VAYXJ1~ J.A.Cl(SON and ~1ILDRED 
JACKSON, his wife, 
Plaintiffs and App·ellees, 
vs. 
\ H. T. COPE and T. TRU1fAN COPE, 
Co-partners, doing business under 
· the fir1n na1ne and style of Cope 
Brothers Lumber Co., 
Defendants and App·ella.nts. 
Case No. 
8012 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
The plaintiffs instituted this suit in the District 
Court of the Third Judicial District in and for Salt Lake 
County, l~tah, alleging that they suffered damages in 
the ~Ulli of $700.00 by reason of defendants' negligence 
in exe~uting a lien \\"aiver to plaintiffs' contractor in 
exchange for a ehec·k in that an1ount paid hy the said 
l'ontl'actul· on hi~ account for lu1nber and other building 
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materials purchased by hiu1 frorn the defendants. After 
a trial before the· Court sitting without a jury, judg1nent 
was . rendered in favor of the plaintiffs for the above 
arnount, plus interest (R. ·71, 72, 73, & 74). 
STATE1IENT O·F FACTS 
On the 27th day of July, 1950, the plaintiffs entered 
into a written agreement with one J. H. Hohnes whereby 
the latter as ~ontra.ctor, agreed to construct a five roo1n 
horne for the pl~iiitiffs on property located at 1777 East 
21st South Street in Salt Lake City, Utah. (Plaintiffs' 
Exhibit ·B, R. 35 _& 36). The plaintiffs thereafter negoti-
·ated a construction loan with Union r_rrust Co1npany, and 
signed a promissory note and ·Inortgage securing the loan 
of $9,050.00. (D:efendants' Exhibit 1, R-. 41). r:rhe plaintiffs 
authorized the loaning institution to discharge funds 
. from. their account directly to Hohnes upon presentation 
by him of lien waiv~rs from the various laborers and 
materialinen with whom he ~as doing business. (Defend-
ants' Exhibit 1, R. 40, 41, 42 & 44). 
The defendants h~ve been engaged as partners for 
t~e past five or six yeats doing business under the finn 
n~1ne of C?·pe Brothers Lu1nber Cornpany, and have sold 
and delivered quantities of lurnber and other building 
1naterials to plaintiffs' contractor liohnes, \vho, prior 
to his bankruptcy in 1951, \Vas construeting dwelling 
houses in and around Salt Lake l~ity, lTtah (It 46, -t-7, 
63 & 64). 
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Holmes conunenced construction of the phtintiffs' 
d'velling in the late Sununer or early Fall of 1950 (R. 
43). He w·as at that tin1e in the course of constructing 
~everal other residences, and this fact was known to 
.both plaintiffs and defendants (R. 46 & 64). 
On October :27, 1950, Hohnes issued a check from 
his construction co1npany in the sun1· of $700.00, payable 
to Cope Brothers Llunber Con1pany, and sent it to them 
by n1ail ( R. 33 & 34). Accompanying this check was a 
form lien waiver, in blank. Defendant H. T. Cope filled 
in the date of receipt, the an1ount, signed the partner-
ship name by hiinself, and returned it to Holmes, as the 
contractor (R. 33 & 34). At this time, Holmes was 
indebted to the defendants in excess of $3900.00 for lum"" 
her and other n1aterials sold and delivered to him on 
open account (R. 34 & 35). It had been a business 
practice for defendants to deliver lumber and other 
building 1naterials to employees of Holmes, who would 
place the orders in advance, call for the merchandise 
at defendants' place of business, and haul it by trucks 
to a warehouse Iuaintained by Holmes, for later distri-
bution to a particular job (R. 63 & 64). The defendants 
had no \Yay of knowing where the materials sold to 
I-Iohnes went, other than to his warehouse, as most of 
the 1nerchandise purchased from defendants was picked 
up at their place· of business ( R. 39, 63' & 64). 
After Holmes received. the above mentioned lien 
waiver frorn the defendants, he co1npleted the form by 
typing in the plaintiffs' job location and on N ove1nber 3, 
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1950, presented the co1npleted lien waiver to the l~ nion 
Trust Co1npany and received a check from it in the sun1 
of $700.00, the amount which he had previously paid to 
the defendants' lumber co1npany (R. ·41 and Plaintiffs' 
Exhibit A). 
In January, 1951, Fioln1es beca1ne financially 
inyolved and, filed for relief in bankruptcy (R,. 48 & 49). 
The plaintiffs' dwelling had not been con1pleted and 
there were 1ne~hanic's liens against the property aggre-
~ating about $1100.00 (I-t. ·44, 45 & 46). Plaintiffs had 
not required Holmes to furnish a bond, as provided by 
law (R. 50), and they were obliged to e1nploy another 
c-ontractor t.o con1plete their job (I( 49, 60 & 61). 
The plaintiffs then brought this action seeking to 
recover the $700.00 which· Fiohnes h~d paid to the defend-
ants' Co1npany, asserting that defendants were negli-
gent in executing the lien waiver· requested by Hohnes. 
The plaintiffs further clai1ned that defendants had fur-
nished no material.s to their job. The evidence in this 
latter respect is vague and not supported by the record 
(R. 37, 56, 57 & 58). At the conclusion of the plaintiff~' 
evidence, counsel for defendants 1noved the Court for 
a judgment of no cause of. action on the ground that 
plaintiffs had failed, as a 1natter of law, to prove a case 
against the defendants upon their theor)r of negligence 
(R. 59). The trial Court suggested that this ('ase should 
have been pleaded upon a theory of assuu1p~it for n1oney 
had and. reeeived, and over the objection of defendant~· 
counsel, a1nended the pre-trjal order to in<·ot'}>Orate thil" 
entirely ne'v theory (R. 60). 
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S'l,_._-\TE~fENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING AND ENTER-
. ' 
ING FINDING OF FACT NO.6 TO THE EFFECT THAT THE 
DEFENDANTS DID NOT FURNISH ANY MATERIAL OR. 
RENDER ANY SERVICE FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF 
PLAINTIFFS' HOME ON THE GROUND AND FOR THE 
REASON THAT SAID FINDING IS WHOLLY UNSUP-
PORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING AND ENTER-
ING FINDING OF FACT NO. 7 TO THE EFFECT THAT 
THE DEFENDANTS RECEIVED THE SUM OF $700.00 
FROM FUNDS BELONGING TO PLAINTIFFS FOR WHICH 
DEFENDANTS FURNISHED NO MATERIAL ON THE 
GROUND AND FOR THE REASON THAT SAID FINDING 
IS WHOLLY UNSUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
POINT III 
THAT THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND THE JUDGMENT IS CON-
TRARY TO LAW. 
POINT IV 
THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AMENDING THE 
PRE-TRIAL ORDER AT THE CONCLUSION OF PLAIN-
TIFFS' CASE ON THE GROUND AND FOR THE REASON 
rrHAT SUCI-I AMENDMENT CREATED AN ENTIRELY NEW 
THEORY OF THE CASE AND WAS FATAL TO PLAIN-
TIFFS' CAUSE OF ACTION. 
';7 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL_ COURT ERRED IN MAKING AND ENTER-
ING FINDtNG OF FACT NO.6 TO THE EFFECT THAT THE 
DE;FENDANTS DID NOT FURNISH ANY MATERIAL OR 
RENDER ANY SERVICE FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF 
PLAINTIFFS' HOME ON THE GROUND AND FOR THE 
REASON THAT SAID FINDING IS WHOLLY UNSUP-
PORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING AND ENTER-
ING FINDING OF FACT NO. 7 TO THE EFFECT THAT 
THE. DEFENDANTS RECEIVED THE SUl\i OF $700.00 
FROM FUNDS BELONGING TO PLAINTIFFS FOR WHICH 
DEFENDANTS ·FURNISHED NO MATERIAL ON THE 
GROUND AND FOR THE REASON THAT SAID FINDING 
IS WHOLLY UNSUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
The only evidence before the Court regarding 
whether or not defendants' lu1nber co1npany had fur-
nished any materials for use. in the construction of 
plaintiffs' dwelling is conjectural and vague in nature, 
and certainly insufficient to justify the findings n1ade 
by the trial Court. Plaintiff Wayne J-ackson in testify-
ing concerning this rna tter, said ( R. 37) : 
By Mr. Bayle on voir dire: Hj\[r.Jackson, 
what is the basis for your answer ~'yes" to that 
question~ 
A. Well, I understand the question to hP ye~~ I 
know that Cope Brother~ Lun1her Cou1puny 
didn't furni~h any lun1l>er in 111~? hou~t'. 
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Q. 'Vhat is the basis of your knowledge 1 
.. A.. Well, l\fill Creek Lun1ber has a lien on my 
place for about seventeen hundred and son1e 
odd dollars which we have established the 
fart that that's all the lumber that could have 
been in there up to that point when John 
Holmes took out bankruptcy. 
Q. ..A .. re you fa1niliar with how much lumber as 
a matter of personal knowledge would go 
into a home the size of yours 1 
.A.. Only "~hat I have learned from building that 
house and my contract with builders. 
Q. You are not a building contractor, are you 1 
A. No. 
Q. And you can't figure the number of board 
feet of the various types of lumber if you 
are given the square footage of a house, can 
you1 
A. No." 
This witness further testified that he had a. conver-
sation with one of the defendants, H. T. Cope, in the 
latter part of April, 1952, which was more than a year 
after plaintiffs' contractor had h~ft their job (R. 38 & 
39). Defendant Cope told this plaintiff that his company 
had not actually hauled materials to plaintiff's address 
but that lumber had been delivered to, Holmes's ware-
hou~e during the time he was working on plaintiffs' 
<lwelling, and that it could have gone anywhere from 
there ( R. 39) . 
Nor does the testirnony of \vitness T£dwin S. Felt, 
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Jr., assist the plaintiffs in proving that none of the 
n1aterials furnished by defendants to Holmes went into 
plaintiffs' ho1ne. :B_,elt testified that as credit rnanager 
for Mill Creek Lurnber and Hardware Cornpany he \vas 
fa1niliar with the fact that his co1npany had delivered 
rnaterials in the amount of $2329.96 (R. 52 & 55), to 
plaintiffs' address. This infor1nation \vas gleaned frorn 
an .exainination of delivei·y tickets, but as to whether 
these rnaterials actually went into plaintiffs' horne w·as 
pure speculation insofar as this witness kne"r, for on 
cross-exrunination he testified as follows (R. 56.) : 
By Mr. Bayle: "Did you make an inspection 
of the job in January of 1951 ~ 
A. Yes. You rnight call it inspection. We cer-
tainly looked at the job. We didn't try and 
. take an inventory. 
Q. You don't know at that tirne that the lurnber 
that was delivered to the site was actually 
in the job, do you~ 
A. Not piece for piece. I will put it that way. 
Q. You rnade. no inspection on that basis;! 
A. Not as an inventory basis. 
Q. There cou'ld have been other u1aterials of 
the type that con1e frorn a lurnber yard thnt 
could have gone in the job, and son1e of your 
materials could have gone sorne place else. 
Is that correct~ 
.:\. That i~ a possibility. \Ye had no iudicati<,n 
actually, you kno,,·, of that happenin~, hut l 
certainly· \vould ~ay it ,,·as \\' i thin the reahu 
of possibility. · 
10 
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Q. And did you kno\v at that time that Mr. 
Hohnes \vas constructing several houses~ 
.A.. Oh, yes. ''T e had furnished several of his 
_-homes. 
Q. ....-\nd they were all going on shnultaneously, · 
weren't they~ 
.A... ~\. g~ood nun1ber of thein were." 
This \Yitness ·produced none of the delivery tickets 
at the trial and his testi1nony can shed little light on 
the question in issue as upon further cross-examination 
he proved that he did not know exactly what materials 
had been furnished (R. 57 & 58). 
By ~Ir. Bayle: "It is possible that you didn't 
furnish the actual flooring. Is that correct~ 
A. That would be an item that could be very 
definitely ascertained. I don't have it right 
in- n1y kno,vledge now of positively one· way 
or another. 
Q .. How about the siding~ 
A. That I would -want to refer to the tickets to 
give a positive answer. 
Q. What about the plaster board~ 
A. I would have to look at my tickets for that, 
s1r. 
Q. You don't kno\v about those itenis? 
A. Not for certain." 
vVitne~~ F1 elt also testified that the Inaterials that 
would co111e frou1 a ltunher yard to- construct a home 
11 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
silnilar in size to that of plaintiffs would approxiinate 
"between twenty-five hundred and three thousand dol-
. . 
lars" (R. 54). This was based upon a "fair esti1nate," 
to use the words of the witness (R. 54), and would have 
no probative value when compared to the conclusion 
drawn by defendant H. T. Cope who had actually been 
engaged in the construction of houses. \Vitness Cope·s 
testimony was that n1aterials furnished by a lumber 
company would ·run about 40% of the total construction 
cost of a residence such as the plain tiffs were building 
(R. 65), and this would be far in excess of the an1ounts 
clai1ned by plaintiffs to have been furnished by ~Iill 
Creek Lurnher and Hardware Co1npany and that pur-
chased by the second contractor (R. 60 & 61). 
While "\Ve do not wish to burden this Court with 
too minute of an interpretation of the foregoing evidence, 
we do feel that the conclusions of the Court with respect 
to these findings rest upon speculative evidence 'vhich 
is too vague to justify the conclusion that none of defend-
ants' materials went into plaintiffs' dwelling. \Ve there-
. fore respectfully urge this Co:urt to reject the trial 
Court's findings in this respect as being unsupported 
by the evidence. 
POINT III 
THAT THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPOR'l' THE 
CO·l~CLUSIONS O:F' LAW, AND THE JUDGMENT IS CON-
TRARY TO LAW. 
12 
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''r e believe the essential question to be disposed of 
on this appeal is "'"hether or not the Judgment entered 
bv the trial Court is contrarY to the law. 
. . 
This is not a case 'vhere the defendants are attempt-
ing to. assert a lien upon plaintiffs' property for materi-
als furnished, but conversely, plaintiffs attempt , to 
recover 1noney which was paid to their c·ontractor in 
exchange for a lien 'vaiver theretofore signed by defend-
ants and delivered by then1 to the contractor upon receiv~ 
ing a payrnent upon his account. The question involves 
Title 38-1-3, l~tah Code Annotated, 1953, which provides 
as follows: 
"Contractors, subcontractors and all persons 
performing labor upon, or furnishing materials 
to. be used in, the construction or alteration of, 
or addition to, or repairs of, any building, struc-
ture or i1nprovement upon land; all foundry men 
and boiler makers; all persons performing labor 
or furnishing materials for the construction, 
repairing or carrying on of any mill, manufactory 
or hoisting works; all persons who shall do work 
or furnish materials for the prospecting, develop-
ment, preservation or working of any mining 
claim, mine, quarry, oil or gas well, or deposit~ 
and licensed architects and engineers and artisans 
'vho have furnished designs, plats, plans, maps, 
specifications, drawings, estimates of cost, sur-
veys or superintendence, or who have rendered 
other like professional service, or bestowed. labor, 
shall have a lien upon the property upon or ron-
cerniHg which they have rendered service, per-
forined labor or furnished rnaterials, for the value 
of the service rendered, labor perfor1ned oi'" 
13 
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f~-·:-·· .-,:materials furnished by each respectively, \vhether 
_·at. the-- instance of the: owner or of any other per-
son acting by- his authority as agent, contractor 
:or otherwis'e. Such liens shall attach only to such 
. -~,,:J: i,l1t~rest as the owner 1nay have in the property, 
.. but the interest of_ a lessee of a 1nining claiin, 1nine 
. ·· · _ · . or deposit~ whether working under bond or other-
..... --.-"" ~· .. -j~'.wise, shall for the purposes of this chapter include 
·products mined and excavated while the same 
rerna1n upon the preinises included within the 
letise.~' 
Had the defendants sought to enforce a lien upon 
plaintiffs' property, they vvould have merely been 
required to show by. a preponde~ance of evidence that 
they had sold lumber and building materials to plain-
tif.~s' contrac-tor Hohnes, for use in their dwelling. It is 
not neces~ary. that the inaterialinan actually deliver the 
goods ___ sold ~6 the job. He can sell directly over the 
counter to the contractor and still. enforce a lien upon 
the pre1nises where the contractor intends to use then1 
even though such goods are diverted by the contractor 
to another job. · As the Court said in Westinghouse 
·Electric Sup-ply (jomp·arvy vs. Hawthorne, 150 P. 2d 
55, 58: 
"A portion of the wire furnished was stored 
for future use as needed, but this does not prevent 
: ~ppellant frpin claiining a lien therefor. ~lateri.als 
:~'.J.) :1 · · : which· are delivered· in good faith by a Inatenal-
Inari, to be incorpoi·ated into a building, arP lien-
. a'ble,_· arid the fact ~,_that they have not been u~Pd 
for the purpose for which ordered \\·ill not defPat 
-· the cia~m.'' 
14 
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\\r e believe the rule stated in Jones on Liens, 3rd 
Edition, paragraph 13:29, page 557, is practical when 
applied to 1nodern business, and is applicable here: 
Hin 1nost states, the actual use of the rnaterials 
is not requisite if they 'vere furnished for a par-
ticular building or. in1provement. To require 
direct and positive testhnony that as to each 
specific article delivered, that it was in fact used 
in the building, would 1nake the mechanics' lien 
law Inore of a burden and a trap than a blessing 
and a help." 
It must be reiue1nbered that in the instant case, the 
plaintiffs atte1npt to recover rnoney paid to defendants 
by plaintiffs' contractor. The Utah lien statute above 
quoted, merely gives the person who furnishes materials 
to a contractor, an addition right in the form of a re.medy 
against the owner of property where the materials are 
intended for use. By waiving this right, can it be said 
that the defendants acted in bad faith.in signing the lien 
waiver in exchange for the $700.00 paid by contractor 
Holmes to apply upon his open account which then 
reflected a balance. of approximately $3900.00 .. rrhis is 
not a case of fraud. The plaintiffs were well aware tha.t 
liohnes was a general contractor and that he had several 
other dwelling jobs under construction at the time plain-
tiff:-; e1nployed 4im (R. 46 & 47). They trusted him as 
tlwir agent to vvithdra\v funds fr<;>nl .their loaning insti-
tution a~ lien \vaiver-s were presented (Defendants' 
1 1~xhibit 1). rrhe defendants 'had sold building n1aterials 
to 1-Iohne~ to be used on the several jobs at his discretion, 
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and as previously stated, he was indebted to the defend-
ants in excess of $3900.00 when he Inade the $700.00 pay-
ment on his·. account. . This money can1e from the bank 
account o.f Holmes and not from the loan account of the 
plaintiffs as the Union Trust Company named Hohnes 
only, as payee. The plaintiffs claim defendants were 
negligent when they executed the lien waiver, or that 
they· were unjustly enriched and ought in good con-
science, return the money. Neither of these propositions 
is tenable. 
What did the defendants do wrong when they exe-
cuted the lien ·waiver~ This was merely the giving up 
of a right which was created for their _benefit under the 
mechanics' lien statute. Waiver is the relinquishment of 
or refusal to accept a right. It i1nplies an election of the 
party ·to forego some advantage which he Inight have 
had. Words and Phrases, Volume 44, Page 516. .As i~ 
said by the author in 57 Corpus Juris Secundun1, para-
graph 222, ·p-age 793 : · 
"The waiver of a mechanics' lien is not the 
giving up of a property right, but Inerely of an 
added remedy." 
Upon the theory adopted and pursued by the plain-
tiffs in their co1nplaint and at the trial, and defendants 
ai~e charged 'with negligence. Can it be said that there 
was a duty owing fro1n the defendants to the plaintiff~! 
If so, 'vhat was that duty? .N egligenre is a relative tel'ln 
and ·its application de vends on the situation of the 
parties, and the degree of care and vigilance 'vhirh the 
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circ.tunstances reasonably iiupose. The first requisite in 
establishing negligence is to show the existence of the 
duty 'vhich it is supposed has not been performed. There 
can be no negligence unless there is a duty which has 
been violated. The afore quoted 1nechanics' lien statute 
(Title 38-1-3), iinposed no duty up~on the defendants 
except to refrain froin activities which would amount 
to collusion with plaintiffs' contractor, and hence result 
in fraud. ..A .. s before stated, this is not a case of fraud 
and the plaintiffs have never so contended. The Inateri-
als were furnished in good faith to Hohnes. He was the 
agent of the plaintiffs and by the provisions of the 
letter of instructions given by the plaintiffs to their loan-
ing institution (Defendants' Exhibit 1), Holmes had-con-
trol of the situation and could draw funds upon .the 
presentation of lien 'Yaivers, wholly within the discretion 
of the l!nion Trust Company. It even went so far as to 
release the loan coinpany from any liability in connection 
with the payinents. s.uppose the defendants didn't keep 
an account of where the 1naterials sold to Holmes were 
eventually used. T'here was no duty owing to plaintiffs 
in that respect and when the defendant, H. r~r. Cope, 
signed the lien waiver in blank, except for the date and 
a1nount received, and returned it by mail to Holmes, he 
relied wholly upon the knowl.edge of the contractor who 
\vas· plaintiffs' agent and assumed to know the true 
facts of where the n1a terials had been used. The evidence 
shows flohnes was counuingling his building 1naterials 
aiHl e\ren had he told defendants where the materials· 
purcha~ed fro111 t.heu1 'vere going to be used, this wouldn't 
17 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ha.ve· made any. difference, as the n1aterials could have 
~asily been 1no~ed to other jobs. Both plai_ntiffs and 
:1efendants_ lost .bY tP.e bankruptcy of Holmes, but the 
pl~intiffs. could. have protected themselves by insisting 
upon a contractors' performance bond as provided by 
law, or by periodic investigations to see that the 
~aterials purchased by their contractor actually went 
into. the construction of their dwelling. N mnerous cases 
have been decided by the courts concerning the appli-
cation of statutes ·pertaining to mechanics' liens. How-
ever, the- decisions are largely concerned with the burden 
of proof required on the part of a materialman to prove 
a claimed lien, which is not our instant case. The instant 
problen1 is considered in 57 Corpus Juris Secundmn, 
paragraph 249, at page 827, wherein the author says: 
"In the absence of fraud and collusion, <~ 
materialman receiving fron1 a contractor 1noney 
paid over by the owner rnay apply such payn1ent 
to any debts owed hirn by the contractor." 
We believe the case of Bounds vs. Nuttle, 30 Atlantie 
2d 263, 181 Maryland 400, is precisely in point. In pass-
ing upon facts similar to our instant case, the court said: 
"Contractors building a nurnber of houses 
frequently have separate account~ with rnaterial 
rnen. · The contractor can apply hi~ n1oney on any 
.bill he ow.es ... It does not have to be applied on the 
. bill for the rnaterials for .the hou~e fro1n the eon-
tract· for which he obtained it. r:I~he ('Oll t ra<'t or\~ 
obligation to the 0\\7ner i~ to furnish and turn oYt·r 
the house \\~ithout liens, but this does not })}'<'YPnt 
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hiin fron1 using his receipts fro In one con tract to 
pay on another. Nor does it prevent the material 
1nan fron1 having his lien, unles·s he agrees that 
it shall be done this \vay, in order tha.t he may 
get his other bills paid and 1na.y collect double 
fro In the owner. That, of course, would be fraud."' 
The court goes on to say: 
H If the failure to protect themselves against 
an i1npecunious contractor causes them to have to 
pay twice for Inaterials, it is their own fault. The 
1nechanics' lien law was passed to cover just such 
a situation -and to protect materialmen. The 
· theory of it is that the owner gets the benefit of 
the n1aterials, and he has control of the money. If 
he negligently and carelessly pays the money out 
to the contractor . without taking precautions to 
see that it is applied to the payment of the materi-
als which go into the building, then he must stand 
the loss rather than the materialman, who has no. 
opportunity to protect himself once he has de-
livered the materials." 
As is said by the author in 40 Corpus Juris, para-
graph 464, page 344 : 
~·The right of a contractor, materialman, or 
workman to a lien is ·not dependent upon the state 
of accounts between the owner and contractor, and 
hence the lien is not defeated or affected by any 
pay1nent to the contractor." 
Even where one performs labor for part of which 
he is entitled to a 1nechanics' lien, and for part of which 
he is not entitled to such lien, he 1na-y, on payments being 
tuade 'vithout specifying which account they are to be 
credited to, appropriate then1 to either account. Christ1~ot 
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'VS. Montana Gold and Silver llfining Company, 1 1\Ion-
tana. 44. 
It is the duty of the owner, in paying his contractor, 
to see that funds are properly distributed to laborers, 
rnaterialmen, and subcontractors. General Sports Co-m-
P.~'f!:Y vs .. Lesli.e and Walter Coo1nbs Lumber Co1npany, 
288 Pac. 949, 143 Oklahoma 297. See also Georgia State 
Savirn.gs Association vs. Swn Lu1nber Con~pany, 280 Pac. 
281, 138 Oklahoma 11, wherein the court said: 
. "A 1nateriahnan is not ordinarily required 
to apply payments made by owner to any specific 
account or debt unless so directed." 
Schwager.- Nettleton Mills vs. Carstens, 180 Pac. 
137, 106 Washington 392. 
Bannock L~~m.ber ·and Coal Company vs. Tribune 
Company, Ltd.,et al. 4 Pac. 2d 663. 
Applying the foregoing principles, we respectfully 
submit that the plaintiffs cannot recover the a1nount 
paid by their contractor to the defendants, neither upon 
the theory of negligence, as relied upon by them in their 
cornplaint, nor upon a money had and received count. 
rrhe gist of an action for llloney had and received is that 
a \vrongdoer has .deprived a person of the· possession of 
property or money to which he is entitled and for which 
r~coyery or compensation is sought. .A.~ . is said in 7 
Co1~pus _Juris ~ecun~un_1, paragraph 9, page 115: 
""In one word, the gi~t of this kind of aetion 
is that the defendant, upon the eir<'Ulllstances of 
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the ra~e, is obliged by the ties of natural justice 
and equity to refund the n1oney." 
and in paragraph -l, page 111 of the srune voluine, the 
author further says : 
''The action of assu1npsit, as the derivation 
of the word in1plies, is founded on an undertaking 
or promise, and the courts have frequently and 
repeatedly stated that a contract, express or 
i1nplied, is necessary to support it." 
\Ve fail to see w·here the plaintiffs in our instant 
case could prevail even though they had set forth in their 
con1plaint an action in assumpsit for money had and 
received. The defendants are not wrongdoers. As pre-
viously stated, it was not plaintiffs' money which th~y 
received fron1 Holmes and applied to his account. The 
money caine from Hohnes on October 27, 1950, and the 
1noney paid to hin1 from plaintiffs' loan account was on· 
Nove1nber 3, 1950, so1ne six days later. A~ is said in 
Jl:lou.rant vs. Pullman Tt·ust and Savings Bank,' ·(Ill.) 41 
N. E. 2d 1006: 
."A party cannot make his own infraction of . 
his agreement the basis of an action for money 
hand and received against the other party who 
stands innocent." 
Even though the plaintiffs suffered an unfortunate 
lOHH due to the bankruptcy of Jlohnes, we do not believe 
they are entitled to recover 1nerely because it 1night 
<tppear generally fajr that recoup1nent of their 1noney 
~hould he afforded fro1n son1e source. We ~gain quote 
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·frorn 58 Corpus Juris Secundurn, paragraph 5, page 915, 
:what- ·we believe to be the principle applicable to our 
instant situation: 
"An action for n1oney had and received \\Till 
. li~ to recover 1noney that had been paid by plain-
tiff to defendan.t for a consideration which ha~ 
wholly failed unless the failure of consideration 
is shown to be attributable to sorne fault on the 
part of plaintiff himself." 
The plaintiffs by their own careless acts rnade it 
possible for Holmes to pay his creditors as he selected. 
;The~e was no privity between plaintiffs and defendants 
. and there .was certainly no unjust enrich1nent on the 
part . of the defendants nor was the pay1nent received 
from Holmes without consideration having been given. 
In support of our contentions, we again quote fron1 58 
Corpus Juris Secundum, paragraph 13, page 922: 
"The action for rnoney had and receiyed 
ordinarily cannot be maintained against one who 
has received rnoney . under a claim of right in 
ignorance of its true ownership, as where n1oney 
wrongfully taken or diverted frorn the plaintiff 
was received by the defendant in good faith fro1n 
the wrongdoer in the ordinary course of busine~s 
or ·for payment of an antecedent debt. The test 
is· honesty and, good faith on the part of fht 
receiver of the money and not his dirigcncf'.'' 
.~nd in 4 · Am~rican Juris prudence, page 512, note 9: 
"To recover in an action for 1noney had and 
received, there n1ust be ~orne priYi t~· behrePn the 
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o'vner and receiver, or 1nala fides, or unjust 
receipt, or, at least, receipt without valuable 
consideration." 
..~.\.t the risk of being repetitions, ";'e desire to elnpha-
~ize that defendants in no 'vay knowingly contributed to 
plaintiffs loss. Quite to the contrary. The defendants 
honestly believed their Ina terials 'vere used by Holmes 
in the plaintiff's d'velling, and there was no reason to 
believe or suspect that the Inateria.ls hadn't been. Holmes 
'vas a reputable contractor and was trusted by the plain-· 
tiffs in the withdra 'val of funds from the loaning insti-
tution. .To require 1naterialn1en to follow materials 
after they have once been delivered to a contractor would 
place an unreasonable and intolerable burden and 
restaint upon their business. We respectfully conclude 
that the trial Court erred in entering judgment upon 
any theory in favor of the plaintiffs and that the judg-
Inent should be reversed. 
POINT IV 
THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AMENDING THE 
PRE-TRIAL ORDER AT THE CONCLUSION OF PLAIN-
TIFFS' CASE ON THE GROUND AND FOR THE REASON 
THAT SUCH AMENDMENT CREATED AN ENTIRELY NEW 
THEORY OF THE CASE AND WAS FATAL TO PLAIN-
TIFFS' CAUSE OF ACTIO!'r. 
\Vhile w.e do not believe that the plaintiffs are 
entitled to recover on the n1erits in this action, we do 
dl~:'i re to di~eus~ the 1natter of an1endment of the pre-
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trial order as suggested and per1nitted by the trial Court 
after .. th·e plaintiffs had rested. It is our i1npression that 
once t~e plaintiffs elected to proceed on· the basis of 
negligence in to.rt, that even if they may have had a good 
cause of action in. assuinpsit, which in t.he instant case 
we 'claim· they had not, their election' would be binding 
and· they could not change their position and adopt an 
entirely new theory after all of their evidence had been 
presented and they had rested. As is said in Page on 
The Law of Contracts, -,{ olume 3, paragraph 1504, page 
2571: 
"Since the doctrine of suing in implied con-
tract upon a tort is really a case of election of 
remedies, the election of one re1nedy 'vhen c·oin-
plete bars the other." 
The ·same rule is recognized and followed in 7 A1nerican 
Juris prudence, paragraph 22, page 123 : 
_"The general rule is that the declaration 1nu~t 
contain a direct allegation of a promise hy defend-
ant. Either an express promise should be alleged, 
or the facts from which it may be i1nplied, other-
wise the complaint will be fatally defective." 
arid in the same Volum-e, paragraph 26 c: 
. "Variance - F'ollowing the rules governing 
civii actions generally,· in assu1npsit the proof 
n1ust conf'or1n to the pleadings. It is not enough 
that the evidence 1nay sho\V a cause of action; it 
n1ust show the cause of action pleaded." 
The Court's attention is also respectfully invitPd to f>~ 
Corpus .Juris Secundu1n, paragraph 30 P (3): 
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H .• A. 1naterial variance between pleadings and 
proof in an action for n1oney had and received is 
fatal to a recovery. Objection that there is a 
yariance n1ay be raised by motion for non-suit." 
\Vhile we recognize that the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure conte1nplate a liberal construction of plead-
ings and grant to the trial courts wide latitude in per-
rnl.tting a1nendlnents to conforin to the proof, we do not 
believe that the funda1nentals of pleading have entirely 
been abrogated. It is generally recognized that _an 
amendment 1nay not be permitted where the effect ·of 
such amend1nent is to state another and distinct cause 
of action. An a1nendment presupposes a change in some-
thing existing, not a substitution of something else for 
that which has been pleaded. We respectfully submit 
that the trial court should have granted defendants' 
1notion for dis1nissal on this ground alone. because of 
the variance between plaintiffs proof and pleadings and 
the inconsistan t theory of their action. 
CONCLUSION 
We respectfully_ submit that the j-udgment of the 
trial Court should be reversed with directions to enter 
judgn1ent in favor of the defendants and against. the 
plaintiffs, no cause of action, and for costs. 
Respectfully subn1itted, 
F. ROBERT BAYLE, 
.Attorney for Defendants 
and .l!ppellants. 
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